2024年11月21日木曜日

Francis Fukuyama Is Right: Socialism Is the Only Alternative to Liberalism

https://jacobin.com/2022/07/francis-fukuyama-liberalism-and-its-discontents-book-review

 

In a CNN interview, after another round of the US government’s sanctions on Russia, the following exchange took place between the show’s host and President Joe Biden’s economic adviser Brian Deese:

CNN: What do you say to those families that say, “Listen, we can’t afford to pay $4.85 a gallon for months if not years, this is just not sustainable”?

Deese: Well, what you heard from the president today was a clear articulation of the stakes. . . . This is about the future of the liberal world order and we have to stand firm.

The events of the past two years, from the start of the global pandemic to the war in Ukraine, and now the global food shortage, are clear signs that liberalism, as a global economic and political system, is in crisis. For now, following the latest bout of ill-health, no plausible challengers have been able to put liberal capitalism out of its misery.

No one has done more to support the idea of liberalism’s resilience and universality than Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama gained a level of international fame in the 1990s as a policy planner at the State Department when he wrote, first, in 1989, a journal article for The National Interest titled “The End of History?” and then, in 1992, an extended treatise, The End of History and the Last Man. His most recent offering, Liberalism and Its Discontents, released in May of this year, reprises the themes of his previous works.

Intellectual Origins

The publication of The End of History and the Last Man coincided with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the independence of various Soviet satellite states like Poland and Lithuania. Initially, all these post-Soviet states adopted liberal, democratic, and capitalist models of governance. Accordingly, Fukuyama became a both famous and somewhat misunderstood figure in academia — a prophet of the triumph of liberal democracy and the material inevitability of capitalism.

In the press, he was written about as a reverse Karl Marx. For those who had not read his book, the lesson to be taken from it was that history was over because American capitalism had won against the Soviet Union. Indeed, in the aftermath of 9/11, journalists, who had misunderstood the book, attempted to contact Fukuyama to ask if history had started again.

However, Fukuyama is distinct from the political-economic partisans of free trade and laissez-faire capitalism like Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman — men who defended the price mechanism as a more rational means of distributing and allocating resources. Instead, Fukuyama is a writer and political scientist deeply concerned with how humans, and their supposed transcendent psyches, operate within specific historical political, economic, and cultural systems.

Although he no longer identifies as a neoconservative, like many of that coterie, Fukuyama is deeply concerned with transhistorical and universal ideals. The failure of the Iraq War, a major neoconservative project that Fukuyama initially supported, seems to have pushed him away from the view that liberalism, democracy, and capitalism occur naturally if the ground is cleared by “well-intentioned” interventions.

Yet his political idealism still runs deep. Born in Chicago in 1952, Fukuyama’s family moved east to Manhattan. His family background contains academic, religious, and mercantile strains. Fukuyama’s paternal first-generation Japanese immigrant grandfather ran a hardware store on the West Coast, while his maternal grandfather was a prominent academic economist and university administrator at Kyoto University. His father was an academic sociologist and minister in the Congregational Church — a bastion of bourgeois liberal and puritan religious idealism. The emphasis Fukuyama places on democratic self-management, political-moral predestination, and individual autonomy within a liberal “priesthood of all believers” seems to be a secularized holdover of his Calvinism.

In 1970, Fukuyama started his undergraduate career at Cornell in classics: he is in many ways a classical political thinker. One can see the influence of ancient Greek political theory everywhere. For instance, Fukuyama takes an interest in the basic Aristotelian units of politics (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) and their relation to liberal modernity, and continues to use the Platonic theory of the soul (divided between reason (logos), spirit (thymos), and appetite (eros) to describe eternal human nature and its need for recognition. During his time at Cornell, Fukuyama fell in with the philosopher and classicist professor Allan Bloom, best known for his 1987 book The Closing of the American Mind, which criticized the practice of moral relativism and historical contextualism at American universities.

Bloom, who was taught by the philosophers Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève, introduced Fukuyama to an idealist intellectual tradition stretching back to Hegel. Strauss influenced the conservative academy with his Natural Right and History (1953), which argued for a transcendent and transhistorical set of naturally occurring rights that might provide politics with a moral compass.

Strauss’s followers in America developed an approach to interpreting political texts that emphasized perennial problems and the power of the authored text to independently generate meaning. Kojève was an unorthodox Marxist thinker, French economic administrator in the European Common Market, and neo-Hegelian who reintegrated the German philosopher’s thinking on history into contemporary politics. His 1946 Introduction to the Reading of Hegel proposed an earlier theory of the “end of history” that influenced Fukuyama’s own thesis. Kojève suggested that the rational Napoleonic Empire’s victory over the absolutist Prussian state at Jena in 1806 represented the apex of human political possibility: the parameters of all future political action were drawn by Napoleon at Jena.

After Cornell, Fukuyama spent time in a comparative literature program at Yale and studied under the post-structuralists Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida in Paris, before switching to political science at Harvard. While Fukuyama would become engaged with the empirical quantitative and qualitative study of hard-nosed foreign policy and international relations, he retained a deep interest in the text and human ideals, which he carried to the RAND Corporation, the State Department, and advisory roles under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.

The success of his 1989 National Interest Article “The End of History?” resulted in a $600,000 advance to write a follow-up — The End of History and the Last Man. This pushed Fukuyama back into writing and academia, where he popularized the idealism of his intellectual precursors.

The End of History — From Nietzsche to Freud

In The End of History, Fukuyama argued that, over the long term, the whole world will converge on variations of the liberal democratic capitalist model. This was because there were, in his mind, no other existing models that could rationally organize modern societies. Rivals, such as Islamic and Christian theocracy, were culturally and geographically restricted — only liberalism, after the end of socialism, could bestride the world as a global system.

In his first book, Fukuyama was keen to stress the fact that history’s ending would not occur synchronously across geographical regions; instead, active outliers in the Global South would eventually catch up after a century or so. The enclaves of non-liberalism that existed in the developing world were not models for an alternative world order. Writing in The End of History, he could proclaim that “it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso.” For Fukuyama, liberalism would win out, not because it was historically inevitable but because it represented an ideal form of rational social organization that, when compared to its competitors, had the fewest internal contradictions.

Yet the little-remembered last chapter of Fukuyama’s The End of History — “The Last Man” — takes its name from Nietzsche’s letztermensch, the passive, secure, and materialistic opposite of the übermensch (superman). Fukuyama uses the image of the Last Man to acknowledge the contradictions inherent in the liberal democratic system and the frustration felt by affluent liberal democratic subjects. As he wrote in 1992, “The passion for equal recognition — isothymia — does not necessarily diminish with the achievement of greater de facto equality and material abundance, but may actually be stimulated by it.”

Fukuyama understood, in 1992, that liberal democracy would be in the most danger not from competing outside forces but from boredom and its effects on a restless population willing to experiment and reach for Platonic thymos, or spirited recognition. In The End of History, Fukuyama, influenced by Kojève’s readings of Hegel and Leo Strauss’s close analysis of Platonic conceptions of the human psyche in The Republic, argued that perennial aspects of human nature like thymos would endanger the coldly rational and technocratic world of advanced liberal democracy. Yet, at the same time, liberal democracy in The End of History is understood to be the only system with the potential to provide adequate recognition to humanity’s thymos.

While the clashes between human nature and the liberal democratic system were an important postscript to The End of History, they have moved center stage in Liberalism and Its Discontents. What remains constant is Fukuyama’s reliance on transhistorical psychological models of immutable human nature, rather than an analysis of material and economic relations, to explain the current fragility of liberal democracy.

His latest publication moves from the metaphysical frameworks of Plato and Nietzsche to the psychological perspective of Sigmund Freud — Liberalism and Its Discontents echoes the title of the Austrian psychoanalyst’s 1930 Civilization and Its Discontents. A deep-seated pessimism about modernity runs through much of Freud’s work. But Civilization and Its Discontents is not simply a rejection of rational society. Freud ironically points out that civilization is the cause of, and balm for, human misery.

Our civilization is largely responsible for our misery . . . we should be much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions. . . . In whatever way we may define the concept of civilization, it is a certain fact, that all the things with which we seek to protect ourselves against the threats that emanate from the sources of suffering are part of that very civilization.

Freud’s theories about the relationship of humans to civilization — that discontent with civilization is generated within the system and used against it — are, to Fukuyama, equally applicable to liberal democracy.

Liberalism in Peril

Indeed, Liberalism and Its Discontents, much like its Freudian forebear, argues that liberal democracy’s two adversaries, “populist conservatism” and “progressivism,” are not outside threats but outgrowths of the liberal tradition itself. As Fukuyama states in his first chapter, “What is Classical Liberalism” — the threat comes from internal economic and social corruptions within liberalism rather than from outside competing models or inherent material contradictions.

On the right, autonomy meant primarily the right to buy and sell freely, without interference from the state. Pushing this notion to extremes, economic liberalism turned into “neoliberalism” and led to grotesque inequalities. On the left, autonomy meant personal autonomy with regard to lifestyle choices, and resistance to the social norms imposed by the society. Pushed down this road, liberalism began to erode its own premise of tolerance as it evolved into modern identity politics. These extreme versions of liberalism then generated a backlash, which is the source of the right-wing populist and left-wing progressive movements that threaten liberalism today.

His solution to these threats is to return to an imagined status quo ante — an uncorrupted, renewed, reformed, and robust historical liberalism that recognizes itself as such. Liberalism and Its Discontents uses the term “classical liberalism” to describe this program, whose capaciousness Fukuyama welcomes. “Classical liberalism is a big tent that encompasses a range of political views that nonetheless agree on the foundational importance of equal individual rights, law, and freedom.”

In his last chapter, “Principles for a Liberal Society,” Fukuyama claims that classical liberalism “may be understood as a means of governing over diversity.” But this diverse political pluralism requires a strong and trusted state. The failing of liberalism since the start of the neoliberal era, he argues, is that it failed to recognize the central role the state must play in managing this diversity.

Throughout the remaining chapters of Liberalism and Its Discontents, Fukuyama identifies the forces that have damaged public trust in liberal democratic governments and the solutions that classical liberalism can supposedly employ. First, in “From Liberalism to Neoliberalism,” he sees neoliberalism as a dangerous outgrowth of economic liberalism that promotes extreme inequality and threatens the body politic.

While Fukuyama does not abandon a commitment to the capitalist market, he avers that, under neoliberalism, the “valid insight into the superior efficiency of markets evolved into something of a religion, in which state intervention was opposed as a matter of principle.”

His second chapter, “The Selfish Individual,” contends with the personal and social effects of neoliberalism. There Fukuyama argues that the economic model of individual rational actors looking to maximize utility has been corrosive to a balanced market that respects competing values like the dignity of labor, family, tradition, and collective altruism. “The individualistic premise on which liberal theory is based is therefore not wrong, but rather incomplete.” Cautiously, Liberalism and Its Discontents suggests that a society that focused on production rather than consumption might help to redress the pathologies of contemporary capitalism. Long gone is the triumphalism of thirty years prior, in its place is a Freudian analysis of the troubled liberal consciousness, which leads Fukuyama to ask, “Would people be willing to sacrifice a bit of consumer welfare in order to maintain the dignity of labor and livelihoods at home?”

In other chapters that seek to address noneconomic issues of identity — and their innate exclusiveness, which clashes with liberalism’s supposed universalism — Fukuyama argues for a move back to a capacious set of civic nationalisms and identities. Following the sociologist Max Weber, he insists that liberal rights are meaningless without the enforcement of the state. Indeed, Fukuyama correctly identifies a strong set of problems with liberal democracy, but his solution — a return to the problem’s root cause: historical classical liberalism — is ultimately at odds with his commitment to a group of values that transcend the particular liberal capitalist system in which they operate. Indeed, the threats to liberal democracy Fukuyama finds in neoliberalism (massive inequality, consumerism, lack of state capacity) were initially the values of early nineteenth-century free-trade classical liberals — ideas neoliberal thinkers like Milton Friedman wanted to resuscitate for the late twentieth century.

But What Is Classical Liberalism?

Fukuyama admits that what he calls classical liberalism has historically specific connotations, yet still decides to use it to attempt to describe an ideal liberalism untainted by recent transformations. This is an odd position for a Hegelian to take. The German philosopher famously insisted that the specific form that society took should not be understood as an aberration or deviation from an ideal; ideals that could not be actualized were instead untimely. As Hegel states in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820), “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”

Absent in the theories of contemporary defenders of liberalism is Hegel’s cold but clear-eyed realism. Defenders of classical liberalism often attempt to anachronistically draw a lineage between their ideas and the supposedly timeless views of a handful of European thinkers like Thomas HobbesJohn Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These theorists did not understand themselves as liberals, being far more concerned with classical political forms and the constitutional squabbles of their day. When we refer to classical liberalism in the present day, we rarely actually mention those who would have recognized the term — mostly individuals who offered a specific set of short-lived free-trade policies connected to a critique of aristocratic landed interests and mercantilism in early nineteenth-century Europe.

Throughout much of the book, Fukuyama jumps between two notions, liberal democracy and liberalism. The former denotes a specific configuration that took shape across much of the Western world after the end of World War II and the latter describes a transhistorical ideal stretching back to the English Civil War and the American Revolution. These two concepts serve to paper over each other’s limitations. Liberalism as an ideal can be marshaled as a critique of the deficits of actually existing liberalism, and actually existing liberalism can be drawn on to reject socialism and other political projects that have not succeeded in becoming hegemonic.

In reality, liberalism, much like conservatism, is simply a set of political moves and cultural associations determined by historical, sociological, and political positioning among factions in particular systems. Witness the relativity generated by comparing the huge differences between Australian, European, and Japanese liberals and their American counterparts. Fukuyama could have headed these criticisms off by clearly defining a narrow set of values for his definition of classical liberalism. Alternatively, he might have coined a new term to describe the actual and more capacious set of values he cares about. What Fukuyama advocates instead is not classical liberalism but a form of humanistic social democracy.

Indeed, what is odd about Liberalism and Its Discontents is that, when Fukuyama sets out to describe the values he cares about without using the term classical liberalism, he often sounds like a socialist or Marxist of the secular, humanist, universalistic, and democratic mold.

In a recent interview with Novara Media’s Aaron Bastani, Fukuyama surprisingly agreed with a large amount of the current populist social democratic program recently proposed by Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn. For instance, in Liberalism and Its Discontents, he argues that economic class, rather than social identities, should be the basis for the subjectivity of political actors: “Social policies should seek to equalize outcomes across the whole society, but they should be directed at fluid categories like class rather than fixed ones like race or ethnicity.”

He goes on to argue that collective conceptions of the common good have been replaced by an overemphasis on personal autonomy, self-actualization, and choice: “Over time in liberal societies, there has been a growing reluctance to posit substantive human ends that have priority over other ends; rather, it is the act of choice itself that has the highest priority.”

Ironically, the “liberal” values Fukuyama cares most about — freedom of speech, institutions of accountability, human rights, mechanisms of personal autonomy, and a conception of the common good beyond identity politics — are eroded by the capitalist dynamics built into the liberal framework. Within a democratic system, liberal freedoms actually exist in spite of capitalism, not because of it. Outside of America, which has a historically underdeveloped left, liberal traditions were won by social democrats and socialists, for whom rights to organize and speak were essential.

Indeed, the dividing lines between Fukuyama’s “populism” and “progressivism” do not map consistently onto other political systems. The discontents generated by liberal democracy have varied from nation to nation. For instance, a particular republican left liberalism in France has rejected what they have understood as American notions about personal autonomy with regard to lifestyle choices and values, and instead insists on a common-good civic nationalism emphasizing universal French values such as strict laïcité, which has, in practiceserved to marginalize Muslims and other minorities.

In Peru, the socialist Pedro Castillo, influenced by Catholic liberation theology, won his election by attacking both economic inequality, neoliberalism, and, to an extent, social liberalism. Consequently, the dynamic map of discontent Fukuyama proposes is specifically an American one — the constellation of attitudes and policy positions that make up American populism and progressivism are not universally fungible.

Fukuyama’s admirable desire for universalistic and humanistic politics frustratingly leads him back to an exhausted nineteenth-century ideology. Instead, we should look at the actual state of modernity in its specificity. China has demonstrated that capitalism can succeed without an accompanying democratic appendage. Its mirror image, an effectively democratic noncapitalist state, has yet to explicitly emerge. In a world defined by political crises and climate breakdown, perhaps the best way to defend the values Fukuyama cares about would be through an imaginative political order. This political order would recognize how capitalism causes destabilizing social consequences such as inequality, and drives the economic causes of nationalism and war — all of which are bad for democracy.

The aim of this political project would be to replace the unconstrained authority of the market with democratic accountability, held together by the lynchpin of organized labor. This has always been the project of myriad socialist traditions — and especially the democratic one. Their institutions were wounded at the end of the last century. This defeat was, however, not total. In almost every country across the developed world, there exist left-wing and socialist forces, some of which have grown their bases. They can fulfil the liberal democratic promise that capitalism is incapable of realizing, but they can only do this if they replace democratic capitalism with democratic socialism. What Fukuyama has made blindingly clear is that, left to its own devices, liberalism will do nothing to alleviate the crises it has caused.


2024年11月20日水曜日

Who is Alberto Fujimori


Introducing Alberto Fujimori: A Controversial Figure in Modern Peruvian History

Alberto Fujimori, who served as President of Peru from 1990 to 2000, remains one of the most polarizing and transformative leaders in the nation’s history. Born on July 28, 1938, in Lima to Japanese immigrant parents, Fujimori rose from relative obscurity to hold Peru's highest office during one of its most tumultuous periods. His presidency, characterized by bold economic reforms, a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, and an authoritarian grip on power, left a profound and divisive legacy. Loved by many for stabilizing the economy and defeating insurgencies, yet reviled for human rights abuses and corruption, Fujimori’s story is one of triumph and controversy.

This introduction aims to explore Fujimori’s background, his rise to power, and the broader context of his presidency, shedding light on why his legacy continues to evoke intense debate in Peru and beyond.


Early Life and Background

Alberto Fujimori, the son of Naoichi Fujimori and Mutsue Inomoto, grew up in a modest household in Lima. His parents emigrated from Japan in the 1930s, bringing with them strong cultural values of discipline and hard work. Fujimori excelled academically, attending the prestigious La Molina National Agrarian University, where he earned a degree in agricultural engineering. Later, he pursued further studies in mathematics and physics in France and the United States.

His professional career began in academia, where he served as a professor and eventually the rector of La Molina University. Known for his technocratic expertise, Fujimori seemed an unlikely candidate for politics. However, the political chaos and widespread dissatisfaction with traditional parties in the late 1980s created an opportunity for an outsider like him.


Peru Before Fujimori: A Nation in Crisis

When Fujimori entered the political arena, Peru was on the brink of collapse. The late 1980s were marked by severe economic hardship, hyperinflation exceeding 7,000%, and widespread poverty. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a Maoist insurgency group, and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) had plunged the nation into violence, particularly in rural areas. The outgoing administration of Alan García had left the economy in shambles, and public trust in traditional political parties was at an all-time low.

Fujimori capitalized on this disenchantment, presenting himself as a pragmatic, independent alternative to the political elite. His campaign slogan, “Honesty, Technology, Work,” resonated with voters desperate for change.


The 1990 Presidential Election: A Surprising Victory

In the 1990 presidential race, Fujimori faced off against Mario Vargas Llosa, a renowned novelist and candidate representing a pro-market economic platform. Despite Vargas Llosa’s fame and intellectual credentials, he was perceived as an elitist detached from the struggles of ordinary Peruvians. Fujimori, on the other hand, positioned himself as a man of the people. He toured rural communities on a tractor and promised to address poverty and inequality.

In a surprising upset, Fujimori defeated Vargas Llosa in a runoff election. His victory symbolized the rejection of Peru’s traditional political class and the public’s readiness for unconventional leadership.


Economic Reforms: The Fujishock

Upon taking office, Fujimori faced an economic crisis of staggering proportions. His administration implemented a series of drastic neoliberal reforms known as the “Fujishock.” These policies included reducing government subsidies, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and opening Peru’s economy to foreign investment.

While these measures stabilized the economy and curbed hyperinflation, they came at a steep social cost. Many Peruvians, particularly in poorer communities, experienced job losses and a decline in living standards. Despite the pain, Fujimori’s economic policies earned him the support of business elites and international financial institutions.


The War Against Insurgency: Crushing the Shining Path

One of Fujimori’s most defining achievements was his aggressive campaign to defeat the Shining Path and MRTA insurgencies. These groups had terrorized Peru for years, killing civilians, sabotaging infrastructure, and instilling fear across the nation. Fujimori declared a “war against terrorism” and empowered the military and intelligence agencies to act decisively.

The capture of Abimael Guzmán, the Shining Path’s leader, in 1992 was a major turning point. Guzmán’s arrest dealt a significant blow to the insurgency, and his public display in a cage marked a symbolic victory for Fujimori’s government. However, the counterinsurgency campaign was marred by serious human rights abuses, including massacres, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings carried out by death squads like the Grupo Colina. These actions, while effective in ending the insurgencies, left a dark stain on Fujimori’s legacy.


The Autogolpe of 1992: Consolidating Power

In April 1992, Fujimori staged an autogolpe, or self-coup, dissolving Congress and assuming near-dictatorial powers. He argued that the move was necessary to bypass political gridlock and implement urgent reforms. With the backing of the military and public approval, he rewrote the constitution, allowing for a stronger executive branch and enabling his reelection in 1995.

While many Peruvians supported these actions at the time, viewing them as a means to restore order and stability, critics accused Fujimori of undermining democracy. His administration became increasingly authoritarian, silencing dissent, co-opting the judiciary, and using state media to attack opponents.


Corruption and Scandal

As Fujimori’s presidency progressed, allegations of corruption and abuse of power became more frequent. His close ally and intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, was implicated in bribery, embezzlement, and illicit arms deals. Montesinos wielded significant influence, using secret funds to buy the loyalty of politicians, judges, and media outlets.

The release of the “Vladivideos,” showing Montesinos bribing officials, triggered a wave of public outrage. These scandals, coupled with accusations of electoral fraud in Fujimori’s controversial bid for a third term in 2000, ultimately led to his downfall.


Exile, Trial, and Legacy

In 2000, amidst mounting pressure, Fujimori fled to Japan, his parents’ homeland, and resigned the presidency via fax. He lived in exile for several years before traveling to Chile in 2005, where he was arrested and extradited to Peru to face trial.

In 2009, Fujimori was convicted of human rights violations, including the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres, and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Despite his conviction, many Peruvians continued to view him as a hero who saved the country from collapse.

Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko Fujimori, has since carried on his political legacy, leading the fujimorismo movement. She remains a controversial figure, reflecting the enduring divisions over her father’s impact on Peru.


Conclusion: A Transformative but Divisive Leader

Alberto Fujimori’s presidency was transformative for Peru, both for better and for worse. He is credited with stabilizing the economy, defeating insurgencies, and modernizing infrastructure, but his tenure was also marked by authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights abuses.

To some, he remains a savior who brought peace and progress during a time of crisis. To others, he is a symbol of the dangers of unchecked power. As Peru continues to grapple with its complex political history, Fujimori’s legacy serves as a reminder of the delicate balance between stability and democracy. His story is a cautionary tale of how a nation’s desperation for change can lead to both remarkable achievements and profound moral compromises.

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アルベルト・フジモリの紹介: 現代ペルー史における物議を醸す人物

1990年から2000年にかけてペルーの大統領を務めたアルベルト・フジモリは、同国の歴史において最も議論を呼ぶ人物の一人です。1938年7月28日、日系移民の両親のもとリマに生まれたフジモリは、無名からペルーの混乱期における最高権力者に上り詰めました。大胆な経済改革、過激な反テロ対策、そして権威主義的な政治運営によって特徴付けられる彼の政権は、愛される一方で強い批判を受け、賛否両論の遺産を残しました。経済の安定化や反乱の鎮圧で称賛される一方、人権侵害や汚職で非難されるフジモリの物語は、成功と論争が交錯するものです。

本稿では、フジモリの生い立ち、権力への道のり、そして彼の大統領時代の背景を探り、彼の遺産がなぜ今日まで強い論争を引き起こしているのかを明らかにします。


幼少期と背景

アルベルト・フジモリは、藤森尚一氏と藤森ムツエ氏の間に生まれ、リマで質素な家庭の中で育ちました。両親は1930年代に日本から移住し、規律と勤勉さという強い文化的価値観を持ち込みました。フジモリは学業で優秀な成績を収め、ラ・モリーナ国立農科大学で農業工学の学位を取得しました。その後、フランスやアメリカで数学と物理学を学び、さらなる教育を受けました。

彼の職業人生は学問の世界から始まり、教授や大学学長として活躍しました。技術的な専門知識で知られたフジモリは、政治の場では一見無縁の人物でした。しかし、1980年代後半の政治的混乱と伝統的政党への不信感が高まる中、彼のようなアウトサイダーにチャンスが訪れました。


フジモリ以前のペルー: 危機に瀕した国家

フジモリが政治の舞台に登場した時、ペルーは崩壊寸前でした。1980年代後半は深刻な経済困難、7,000%を超えるハイパーインフレーション、そして広範な貧困に見舞われていました。毛沢東主義を掲げる反乱組織「センデロ・ルミノソ(輝ける道)」や「トゥパク・アマル革命運動(MRTA)」は、特に地方で暴力を振るい、国を恐怖に陥れていました。前任者アラン・ガルシア政権は経済を崩壊させ、伝統的政党への信頼は最低水準に達していました。

フジモリはこの不満を利用し、実用的で独立した代替案を提示しました。彼のキャンペーンスローガン「誠実さ、技術、仕事」は、変化を切望する有権者の心をつかみました。


1990年の大統領選挙: 驚きの勝利

1990年の大統領選では、フジモリは有名な作家で自由市場経済を支持する候補者、マリオ・バルガス・リョサと対峙しました。バルガス・リョサは知名度と知性を持つ人物でしたが、一般ペルー人の苦境から離れたエリート主義者と見られていました。一方、フジモリは庶民派としての立場を確立し、地方をトラクターで巡り、貧困や不平等に取り組むと約束しました。

予想外の結果として、フジモリは決選投票でバルガス・リョサを破り勝利を収めました。この勝利はペルーの伝統的な政治階級の拒絶と、非伝統的なリーダーへの期待を象徴するものでした。


経済改革: フジショック

政権を握ると同時に、フジモリは非常に厳しい経済危機に直面しました。彼の政権は「フジショック」として知られる一連の急進的な新自由主義改革を実施しました。この政策には、政府補助金の削減、国営企業の民営化、そしてペルー経済の外国投資への開放が含まれます。

これらの措置は経済を安定させ、ハイパーインフレーションを抑えることに成功しましたが、社会的には大きな代償を伴いました。多くのペルー人、特に貧困層では、職を失い生活水準が低下しました。それにもかかわらず、フジモリの経済政策はビジネスエリートや国際金融機関からの支持を得ました。


反乱対策: センデロ・ルミノソの鎮圧

フジモリの最も重要な功績の一つは、センデロ・ルミノソやMRTA反乱軍を鎮圧するための積極的な取り組みでした。これらの組織は何年にもわたり、民間人を殺害し、インフラを破壊し、国全体に恐怖を広めていました。フジモリは「テロとの戦争」を宣言し、軍と情報機関に断固たる行動を求めました。

1992年にセンデロ・ルミノソの指導者アビマエル・グスマンが逮捕されたことは、大きな転機となりました。グスマンの逮捕は反乱軍に大打撃を与え、その後の公開された檻の中での姿はフジモリ政権にとって象徴的な勝利を意味しました。しかし、反乱鎮圧キャンペーンは、グルーポ・コリナと呼ばれる死の部隊による虐殺、強制失踪、超法規的処刑など深刻な人権侵害を伴いました。


1992年のオートゴルペ: 権力の集中

1992年4月、フジモリはオートゴルペ(自己クーデター)を敢行し、議会を解散し、事実上の独裁権を掌握しました。彼は、この行動が政治的停滞を回避し、緊急改革を実行するために必要だと主張しました。軍の支援と世論の支持を得て、憲法を書き換え、1995年に再選を可能にしました。

当時、多くのペルー人はこれを支持し、秩序と安定を回復する手段と見なしましたが、批評家たちはフジモリを民主主義を侵害する独裁者と非難しました。


汚職とスキャンダル

フジモリ政権が進むにつれ、汚職や権力濫用の疑惑が増えました。彼の側近である情報局長ウラジミロ・モンテシーノスは、賄賂や横領、違法武器取引に関与したとして非難されました。モンテシーノスは多額の秘密資金を用いて政治家や裁判官、メディアを買収し、強大な影響力を持ちました。

「ブラディビデオ」と呼ばれるモンテシーノスが現金を渡している映像が公開されると、国民の怒りが爆発しました。これらのスキャンダルや2000年の大統領選挙における不正疑惑により、フジモリ政権に対する支持は失われました。


亡命、裁判、そして遺産

2000年、圧力が高まる中、フジモリは日本に逃亡し、ファックスで大統領職を辞任しました。その後数年間、日本で亡命生活を送りましたが、2005年にチリへ渡航した際に逮捕され、ペルーに送還されました。

2009年、フジモリはラ・カントゥタ事件やバリオス・アルトス事件を含む人権侵害で有罪判決を受け、25年の懲役刑を言い渡されました。それにもかかわらず、彼を国の危機から救った英雄と見なすペルー人も多く存在します。

彼の娘であるケイコ・フジモリは、フジモリ主義(フジモリスモ)を継承し、政治活動を続けています。彼女の存在は、父親の遺産がいまだペルー社会を二分していることを象徴しています。


結論: 賛否両論の変革者

アルベルト・フジモリの大統領時代は、ペルーにとって善悪両面で変革の時期でした。彼は経済の安定化、反乱軍の鎮圧、インフラの近代化で称賛される一方、権威主義、汚職、人権侵害で非難されています。

一部の人々にとって、彼は危機の時代に平和と進歩をもたらした救世主です。一方で、無制限の権力の危険性を象徴する存在でもあります。ペルーが複雑な政治史と向き合い続ける中、フジモリの遺産は安定と民主主義の微妙な均衡を示す警鐘となっています。彼の物語は、変革を求める国が驚異的な成果と重大な道徳的妥協の両方を経験し得ることを示しています。

フジモリ以前のペルー

 Before Alberto Fujimori became president in 1990, Peru was in a state of profound crisis, marked by political instability, economic collapse, and rampant terrorism. The country faced challenges that made it one of the most volatile nations in Latin America at the time. Below are the key conditions that defined Peru before Fujimori's presidency:


1. Political Instability

  • Peru’s political system was fragile and lacked public trust. Presidents were often seen as ineffective, and governments were unable to address the country’s growing problems.
  • The administration of Alan García (1985–1990), Fujimori’s predecessor, is remembered as one of the most disastrous in Peruvian history. García’s populist economic policies and mismanagement plunged the country deeper into crisis.

2. Economic Collapse

  • Hyperinflation: By the late 1980s, Peru was suffering from some of the worst hyperinflation in the world, reaching a staggering 7,482% in 1990. Basic goods became unaffordable, and many Peruvians lost their savings.
  • Poverty: Over half of Peru's population lived in poverty, with widespread unemployment and underemployment.
  • External Debt: Peru defaulted on its foreign debt in the late 1980s, leading to economic isolation. International institutions such as the IMF and World Bank cut off assistance.
  • The country was essentially bankrupt, with state institutions barely functioning.

3. Terrorism and Violence

  • The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso): A Maoist insurgency, the Shining Path, waged a brutal guerrilla war against the Peruvian state starting in 1980. Their campaign included bombings, assassinations, and massacres, particularly in rural areas.
  • Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA): A smaller but significant Marxist group also carried out acts of terrorism, including kidnappings and armed attacks.
  • The insurgencies created a climate of fear and instability, with entire regions controlled by rebels. The state’s military response was often equally brutal, leading to widespread human rights abuses.
  • By 1990, tens of thousands of lives had been lost, and millions were displaced from their homes.

4. Erosion of Democracy

  • The inability of democratic governments to address these crises led to a loss of faith in democratic institutions.
  • Corruption and inefficiency plagued the political elite, creating a fertile ground for an outsider like Fujimori to emerge with promises of change.

5. Weak Infrastructure

  • The state had minimal presence in rural and Indigenous regions, leaving these areas vulnerable to insurgencies and economic neglect.
  • Infrastructure, education, and healthcare were underfunded and poorly managed, perpetuating inequality between urban and rural populations.

6. Social Tensions

  • Peru was deeply divided along class, racial, and geographic lines. Indigenous and rural communities were disproportionately affected by poverty, violence, and state neglect.
  • Urban elites in Lima were largely disconnected from the struggles of the majority population in the Andean highlands and Amazonian regions.

Why Fujimori’s Rise?

In this context of pervasive crisis, Fujimori's outsider status, technocratic promises, and populist appeal resonated with a desperate population. Running on a platform of "honesty, technology, and work," he presented himself as an alternative to both the discredited traditional elites and the insurgent ideologies wreaking havoc on the country.

When Fujimori assumed power in 1990, he inherited a nation on the brink of collapse, setting the stage for the transformative—and controversial—decade of his presidency.

You said:
translate to japanese
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

フジモリが1990年に大統領に就任する前のペルーは、政治的不安定経済崩壊、そして凶暴なテロに覆われた深刻な危機状態にありました。当時のペルーは、ラテンアメリカでも最も混乱した国の一つとして知られていました。以下は、フジモリ政権以前のペルーの主な状況です:


1. 政治的不安定

  • ペルーの政治システムは脆弱で、国民の信頼を欠いていました。歴代の大統領は無力とみなされ、政府は国の問題を解決することができませんでした。
  • フジモリの前任者である**アラン・ガルシア(1985年~1990年)**政権は、ペルー史上最も失敗した政権の一つとして記憶されています。ガルシアのポピュリスト的な経済政策と管理の失敗が、危機をさらに深刻化させました。

2. 経済崩壊

  • ハイパーインフレ: 1980年代後半、ペルーは世界最悪級のハイパーインフレに苦しんでいました。1990年にはインフレ率が**7,482%**に達し、基本的な生活必需品が手の届かないほど高騰しました。
  • 貧困: 国民の半数以上が貧困線以下で生活し、失業や不完全雇用が蔓延していました。
  • 対外債務: 1980年代後半にペルーは対外債務の返済を停止し、経済的孤立に追い込まれました。国際通貨基金(IMF)や世界銀行からの支援も断たれました。
  • 国家は事実上破産状態にあり、公共機関はほとんど機能していませんでした。

3. テロと暴力

  • センデロ・ルミノソ(輝ける道): 毛沢東主義を掲げる反乱組織「センデロ・ルミノソ」は、1980年からペルー国家に対して残虐なゲリラ戦を展開していました。その活動には爆破、暗殺、虐殺が含まれ、特に農村部が大きな被害を受けました。
  • トゥパク・アマル革命運動(MRTA): より小規模ではありますが、同様にマルクス主義を掲げたグループが誘拐や武装攻撃を行っていました。
  • これらの反乱により、恐怖と不安定の時代が生まれ、国の一部地域が事実上反乱軍の支配下に置かれていました。国家の軍事的対応も同様に残酷で、多くの人権侵害が発生しました。
  • 1990年までに数万人が命を落とし、数百万人が家を追われる結果となりました。

4. 民主主義の後退

  • これらの危機に対処できなかった民主的な政府への信頼は失われました。
  • 腐敗と無能が政治エリートを蝕み、フジモリのような「局外者」が変革を訴えて台頭する土壌が生まれました。

5. 弱体化したインフラ

  • 国家の存在感は農村部や先住民の地域で極めて希薄であり、これらの地域は反乱軍や経済的放置の影響を特に受けていました。
  • インフラ、教育、医療は資金不足で管理が行き届かず、都市と農村の間の不平等が拡大していました。

6. 社会的緊張

  • ペルーは階級、人種、地理的な線引きで深刻に分断されていました。貧困、暴力、国家の無視による影響を最も受けたのは先住民や農村部のコミュニティでした。
  • 都市部のエリート層は、アンデス山岳地帯やアマゾン地域の大多数の人々の苦境にほとんど無関心でした。

フジモリの台頭の背景

このような広範な危機の中で、フジモリは「正直、技術、仕事」を掲げ、既存のエリートとも反乱軍のイデオロギーとも異なる選択肢を提示しました。このような状況下で、フジモリは絶望する国民の支持を得て、変革の象徴として登場したのです。

フジモリが1990年に政権を握った時、彼が受け継いだのは崩壊寸前の国家でした。それが、彼の統治時代の劇的かつ議論を呼ぶ10年間の基盤となりました。



what was unemployment rate before fujimori?
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Before Alberto Fujimori assumed office in 1990, Peru's unemployment and underemployment rates were alarmingly high due to the severe economic crisis. While precise unemployment figures from the late 1980s vary, estimates suggest that unemployment hovered around 8-10%, but this figure alone does not capture the full extent of the labor crisis.

Key Employment Issues in Late 1980s Peru

  1. High Underemployment:

    • More than half of the workforce was underemployed, meaning they worked in low-paying, informal, or part-time jobs that did not provide sufficient income to meet basic needs.
    • The informal economy grew significantly, with many Peruvians turning to street vending or precarious jobs to survive.
  2. Economic Collapse:

    • Hyperinflation destroyed purchasing power, making even employed individuals unable to afford basic goods.
    • Many businesses closed due to economic instability, further exacerbating job losses.
  3. Rural and Urban Disparities:

    • Rural areas, heavily impacted by the Shining Path insurgency, saw reduced agricultural productivity and displacement of communities, leading to migration to cities.
    • Urban centers faced increased pressure on job markets as displaced individuals sought work.
  4. Youth Unemployment:

    • Young people were disproportionately affected, with few opportunities for formal education or vocational training in the crumbling economy.

Comparison with Fujimori's Presidency

When Fujimori took office, addressing unemployment and underemployment became a critical goal. His market-oriented economic reforms, though controversial, helped stabilize inflation and attract foreign investment, leading to some recovery in formal employment later in the 1990s. However, the informal labor sector remained dominant throughout his presidency.

You said:
translate to japanese
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

フジモリが1990年に大統領に就任する前、ペルーは深刻な経済危機により失業率と不完全雇用率が非常に高かったです。1980年代後半の正確な失業率は異なる推計がありますが、**失業率はおおよそ8〜10%**だったとされています。ただし、この数字だけでは労働市場の問題の全貌は把握できません。

1980年代後半のペルーにおける主要な雇用問題

  1. 高い不完全雇用:

    • 労働力の半数以上が不完全雇用にあり、つまり十分な収入を得るために低賃金で不安定な仕事やパートタイムの仕事に従事していました。
    • 非公式経済が急成長し、多くのペルー人が生計を立てるために街頭販売や不安定な仕事に頼るようになりました。
  2. 経済崩壊:

    • ハイパーインフレにより購買力が急激に低下し、雇用されている人々でさえ基本的な生活必需品を購入できない状況になりました。
    • 多くの企業が経済的な不安定さのために閉鎖され、さらなる失業を引き起こしました。
  3. 農村部と都市部の格差:

    • 農村部はセンデロ・ルミノソ(輝ける道)などの反乱軍の影響を大きく受け、生産性が低下し、コミュニティの移住が進みました。
    • 都市部では、農村から移住してきた人々が職を求めて押し寄せ、就業市場にさらなる圧力をかけました。
  4. 若年層の失業:

    • 若者は特に影響を受け、正式な教育や職業訓練の機会がほとんどなく、仕事の機会も限られていました。

フジモリ政権との比較

フジモリが政権を握った際、失業と不完全雇用の問題は最も重要な課題の一つとなりました。彼の市場志向の経済改革は議論を呼びましたが、インフレを安定させ、外国投資を引き寄せたことで、1990年代に一部回復が見られました。しかし、非公式労働市場はフジモリ政権下でも引き続き支配的であり続けました。

You said:
Why the Shining Path went to the rural area? Is it a strategy from Maoism?
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Yes, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) went to rural areas as part of a strategy inspired by Maoist ideology. Mao Zedong, the Chinese communist leader, advocated for a revolutionary strategy that focused on mobilizing peasants in the countryside rather than relying solely on urban workers. This was based on his belief that the rural population, due to its size and discontent, could be the primary force for revolution.

For the Shining Path, this strategy was crucial in the 1980s when they began their insurgency in Peru. They targeted the rural areas, particularly in the highlands and Andean regions, where the population was largely poor and disenfranchised. The Shining Path sought to exploit the inequality and neglect that these areas faced, using them as a base for recruitment and resistance against the central government.

Their Maoist-inspired tactics included:

  1. Peasant Mobilization: They aimed to organize rural peasants and build support among those suffering from poverty and lack of state services.
  2. Guerrilla Warfare: The Shining Path used guerrilla warfare in these rural areas to undermine the state and to gain control over territory.
  3. Use of Violence: They employed extreme violence, including massacres, in an attempt to intimidate and eliminate those who opposed them, whether they were government forces or civilians.

This rural focus was in line with Maoist thought, which emphasized the role of peasants in revolution and the need to establish a stronghold in rural areas as a launching pad for a broader national revolution.

You said:
Do we have data how many people were killed or kidnaped by the group?
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Yes, there is extensive data on the violence perpetrated by the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) during its insurgency in Peru, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. The group was responsible for a large number of deaths, kidnappings, and other forms of violence.

Here are some key figures based on reports from Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), which conducted an in-depth investigation into the violence that occurred between 1980 and 2000:

1. Death Toll:

  • The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) estimated that 69,280 people were killed between 1980 and 2000 as a result of the internal armed conflict in Peru.
  • Of these deaths, 54% were attributed to the Shining Path, which means they were responsible for roughly 37,000 deaths.
  • The Shining Path's victims included civilians, government officials, police, and military personnel. They were responsible for massacres, targeted killings, and widespread terror in rural areas, particularly in the Andean highlands.

2. Kidnappings:

  • The Shining Path was notorious for kidnapping government officials, police officers, and civilians, often as part of their campaign to destabilize the government and intimidate the population.
  • They also engaged in high-profile kidnappings, such as the 1996 Japanese Embassy hostage crisis, in which a group of Shining Path militants took hundreds of hostages, including diplomats and officials, at a party hosted by the Japanese ambassador in Lima.

3. Violence Against Civilians:

  • The Shining Path often targeted rural communities, forcing them to support their cause or face violent retribution. Villages and towns that resisted the insurgents faced massacres, and their residents were frequently forced to provide food, shelter, and assistance to the militants.
  • The group used brutal tactics such as bombings, shootings, and torture to terrorize local populations and maintain control over territory.

4. Other Forms of Violence:

  • Sexual violence was also reported as part of the group's operations, with women being targeted for abuse, forced labor, or as part of the group's attempts to exert control.
  • The Shining Path employed "terrorist tactics" such as bombings and shootings in urban areas, aiming to disrupt daily life and government functioning.

Impact on Indigenous Communities:

  • Indigenous populations in rural areas were particularly affected, as the Shining Path targeted them for both recruitment and violence. Many of these communities were already marginalized by the central government, and the group exploited their grievances while subjecting them to extreme violence.

End of the Insurgency:

  • By the mid-1990s, the Peruvian government, under President Alberto Fujimori, had largely neutralized the Shining Path, particularly with the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992. However, the group's violence and legacy of terror continued to affect Peru for many years after its decline.

The impact of the Shining Path's violence is still felt today, with many survivors and relatives of the victims seeking justice and reparations. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's report, which documented these atrocities, is one of the most comprehensive sources of data on the group’s activities.

You said:
translate to japanese
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

はい、ペルーにおけるセンデロ・ルミノソ(輝ける道)の暴力に関する詳細なデータはあります。特に1980年代と1990年代の反乱時代における殺害、誘拐、その他の暴力行為に関してです。

以下は、1980年から2000年までのペルーでの暴力に関する詳細なデータです。この期間の調査はペルーの**真実と和解委員会(CVR)**によって行われました。

1. 死者数:

  • 真実と和解委員会(CVR)は、1980年から2000年にかけて、ペルーでの内戦によって69,280人が命を落としたと推定しています。
  • そのうち54%がセンデロ・ルミノソによるもので、つまりおおよそ37,000人がセンデロ・ルミノソの暴力によって命を奪われたことになります。
  • センデロ・ルミノソの犠牲者は、市民、政府職員、警察官、軍人など多岐にわたります。特に農村部、特にアンデス地方での虐殺、標的を定めた殺害、そして広範囲にわたる恐怖の政治が行われました。

2. 誘拐:

  • センデロ・ルミノソは政府関係者、警察官、市民の誘拐で悪名高いです。これらの誘拐は、政府を不安定化させ、一般市民を恐怖に陥れるための戦術の一部でした。
  • 有名な事件としては、1996年の日本大使館人質事件があります。この事件では、センデロ・ルミノソの武装グループが、リマの日本大使公邸で行われていたパーティーの参加者を数百人規模で人質に取りました。

3. 市民に対する暴力:

  • センデロ・ルミノソはしばしば農村部のコミュニティをターゲットにし、その地域の住民に支持を強制するか、暴力的な報復を受けることを警告しました。
  • 反抗する村や町は虐殺に遭い、住民はしばしばセンデロ・ルミノソに食料や避難所、支援を提供するよう強制されました。
  • このグループは爆弾、銃撃、拷問などの手段を用いて地域住民を恐怖に陥れ、支配権を維持しました。

4. その他の暴力:

  • 性的暴力もグループの活動の一環として報告されています。女性は強制労働やグループによる支配の一環として虐待や暴行を受けました。
  • センデロ・ルミノソは**「テロリスト戦術」**として、都市部で爆弾や銃撃を行い、日常生活や政府の機能を混乱させることを目指しました。

先住民コミュニティへの影響:

  • 農村部の先住民コミュニティは特に影響を受けました。センデロ・ルミノソはこれらのコミュニティを勧誘暴力のターゲットにしていました。これらのコミュニティはすでに中央政府から疎外されていたため、センデロ・ルミノソはその不満を利用し、同時に過酷な暴力をもって支配しようとしました。

反乱の終息:

  • 1990年代半ば、ペルー政府はフジモリ大統領の下でセンデロ・ルミノソの反乱をほぼ鎮圧し、特にアビマエル・グスマン(センデロ・ルミノソの指導者)の1992年の逮捕が決定的でした。しかし、センデロ・ルミノソの暴力とその恐怖の遺産は、ペルーに長らく影響を与え続けました。

センデロ・ルミノソの暴力の影響は今日でも感じられており、犠牲者やその家族は引き続き正義と賠償を求めています。**真実と和解委員会(CVR)**の報告書は、このグループの活動に関するデータの中で最も包括的な情報源の一つです。

what was the goverment like before fujimori? democratic?
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

Before Alberto Fujimori became president in 1990, Peru went through a series of unstable democratic governments and periods of military rule. The country’s political system was characterized by frequent instability, corruption, and economic turmoil, particularly during the 1980s. Here’s a breakdown of the situation in Peru prior to Fujimori’s rise to power:

1. Democratic Rule (1980-1985):

  • Return to Democracy: In 1980, after a period of military dictatorship from 1968 to 1980, Peru returned to democratic rule with the election of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who had served as president in the 1960s. He was elected once again in 1980 for a second term.
  • Economic Crisis: Despite the return to democracy, Peru’s economy was in a state of severe crisis. The country faced hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and a growing public debt. This economic crisis was worsened by external factors like global oil price hikes.
  • Terrorism: During this time, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a Maoist insurgent group, began an armed campaign in rural areas, escalating violence and creating insecurity. The government struggled to control the country’s growing terrorist threat, particularly in the Andean highlands.

2. Alan García’s Presidency (1985-1990):

  • New Democratic Government: In 1985, Alan García Pérez of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) was elected president. He promised to address Peru’s economic problems and fight poverty, but his presidency quickly became embroiled in controversy.
  • Economic Mismanagement: García’s government initially adopted populist policies, including large-scale nationalization of industries and increasing government spending. However, this led to hyperinflation, economic collapse, and widespread poverty. Inflation peaked at more than 7,000% by the end of his term.
  • Terrorism Escalation: During García’s presidency, the violence from the Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) worsened. The Shining Path became more active, particularly in rural areas, and the government’s response involved increased repression, including human rights abuses.
  • Public Disillusionment: García’s policies failed to stabilize the economy, and by the time his term ended in 1990, Peru was facing a crisis in governance. There was growing frustration with the economic situation, rising violence, and the inability of the government to maintain control.

3. The Political Landscape Before Fujimori:

  • Instability and Disillusionment: The political climate in the late 1980s was marked by a lack of trust in traditional political parties and institutions. Public dissatisfaction with the ruling elites and the inability of governments to address the country’s deep social and economic problems led to widespread disillusionment with the political system.
  • Corruption: Both the Belaúnde and García administrations were accused of corruption, further eroding public trust. This created a sense that the country’s political system was failing to serve the interests of ordinary Peruvians.

4. Military Influence:

  • While Peru was officially democratic, the military maintained significant influence behind the scenes, particularly during times of crisis. The military had previously ruled the country from 1968 to 1980, and even after the return to democracy, they were seen as a stabilizing force during periods of extreme instability, particularly during the fight against terrorism.

Fujimori’s Rise to Power:

  • Fujimori’s Election (1990): In this context of economic and political crisis, Alberto Fujimori, an outsider with no prior political experience, ran for president in 1990. He campaigned as an alternative to the corrupt political establishment and promised to tackle the economic crisis and defeat the growing insurgency.
  • Fujimori’s Appeal: Fujimori's appeal to the electorate was built on a platform of honesty, technocracy, and strong leadership. He won the election in a landslide, defeating Mario Vargas Llosa, a prominent novelist and candidate representing the political elite. Fujimori’s outsider status and his promises to reform the country resonated with many Peruvians who were disillusioned with the political system.

In summary, while there were democratic elections and transitions of power before Fujimori, the political environment was marked by economic mismanagement, political instability, and increased violence from insurgent groups. The government before Fujimori's presidency could be considered democratic in theory, but it was ineffective in addressing the country's pressing challenges, leading to a crisis of governance that Fujimori capitalized on.

You said:
translate to japanese
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT

フジモリ大統領が就任する前のペルーは、民主主義政府と軍事政権が交替する不安定な時期でした。特に1980年代には、頻繁な政治的不安定、腐敗、経済的混乱が特徴でした。以下に、フジモリ以前のペルーの状況を説明します。

1. 民主主義政権(1980-1985年)

  • 民主主義への復帰: 1980年、ペルーは1968年から1980年までの軍事独裁時代を終え、再び民主主義に戻りました。フェルナンド・ベラウンデ・テリが大統領に再選され、1980年に就任しました。
  • 経済危機: 民主主義が復帰したものの、ペルーの経済は深刻な危機に見舞われていました。ハイパーインフレ大規模な失業、そして膨大な外債が問題となっていました。特に石油価格の高騰など、外部要因も悪化させました。
  • テロリズム: この時期、センデロ・ルミノソ(輝ける道)という毛沢東主義のゲリラ集団が農村部で武装闘争を始め、暴力が拡大しました。政府は増大するテロリズムの脅威に対処できず、混乱が続きました。

2. アラン・ガルシア大統領(1985-1990年)

  • 新たな民主主義政府: 1985年、アラン・ガルシア(アプラ党)が大統領に選出されました。彼は貧困対策や経済改善を掲げて就任しましたが、すぐに論争が巻き起こりました。
  • 経済的誤管理: ガルシア政権はポピュリズム政策を採用し、大規模な国有化や政府支出の増加を行いましたが、これがハイパーインフレ経済崩壊貧困の悪化を招きました。最終的にインフレ率は1980年代末に**7,000%**に達しました。
  • テロリズムの悪化: ガルシア政権下ではセンデロ・ルミノソや**トゥパク・アマル革命運動(MRTA)**の活動が激化しました。特にセンデロ・ルミノソは暴力的な攻撃を続け、農村部での人々の恐怖を増大させました。
  • 市民の失望: 経済政策の失敗とテロリズムの拡大により、ガルシア政権の支持は急激に低下し、1990年には国民の不満が爆発しました。

3. フジモリ前の政治情勢:

  • 不安定と失望: 1980年代末には、従来の政治勢力への信頼が失われていました。政治的な安定が欠如していたため、ペルーの国民は政府や政党に対して強い不信感を抱いていました。
  • 腐敗: ベラウンデやガルシア政権は腐敗の批判を受けており、その結果、政治システムへの信頼がさらに失われました。このことがペルーの政治システムの失敗を強調し、フジモリの登場を後押ししました。

4. 軍の影響:

  • ペルーは公式には民主主義国家でしたが、軍は依然として重要な影響力を持っていました。軍事政権は1968年から1980年まで続いており、民主主義に戻った後も、国家の危機的な状況では軍が安定をもたらす役割を果たしていました。

5. フジモリの台頭:

  • フジモリの選挙(1990年): 経済危機と政治的混乱の中、アルベルト・フジモリという政治経験のないアウトサイダーが1990年に大統領選挙に立候補しました。彼は腐敗した政治体制に対抗する新しい選択肢として現れ、経済危機の解決とテロリズムの撲滅を約束しました。
  • フジモリの魅力: フジモリの選挙運動は、誠実さ技術力強力な指導力を掲げたもので、特に政治システムに失望した多くのペルー市民に共感を呼びました。彼は、マリオ・バルガス・リョサという著名な作家・政治家を破り、圧倒的な支持を集めて選出されました。

要するに、フジモリが大統領になる前のペルーは、経済的誤管理政治的不安定、そして増大する暴力に直面しており、民主主義が理論上は存在していたものの、実際には非常に効果的ではありませんでした。このような危機的状況において、フジモリは大きな支持を得ることができました。


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