Congress may not deploy its subpoena power to “interfere with” a case “pending in a court of competent jurisdiction.” [Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 194 (1880)]

115. But Congress lacks any enumerated power entitling it to “conduct oversight” into a single state prosecution in which a local grand jury has voted to bring criminal charges. The Supreme Court held more than 140 years ago that Congress may not deploy its subpoena power to “interfere with” a case “pending in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 194 (1880). Congress is not “a law enforcement or trial agency,” for “[t]hese are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. “No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated are indefensible.” Id. And under the Tenth Amendment, the “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend X. This framework reflects our principles of federalism and dual sovereignty, by which the states “remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. The Constitution “reposed [police power] in the States.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. It clearly conferred “primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” on the States. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3. There is no congressional power to interfere—as the Chairman and the Committee seek to do here—with the states’ “proper sphere of authority” to police. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. In short, Congress has no legitimate legislative objective to pursue here. 116. As a result, in his letters and public statements, Chairman Jordan and his congressional allies have changed their story multiple times, creating new and constantly shifting purported legislative interests and purposes that supposedly justify the Committee’s unwarranted “incursion” into a state criminal case. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920. These are just obvious pretexts for interfering with the District Attorney’s Office’s work enforcing the laws of the State of New York on behalf of the People. 117. The subpoena served on Mr. Pomerantz fails to satisfy the Supreme Court’s test in Mazars. 140 S. Ct. at 2035. Namely, the purported legislative purposes Chairman Jordan has invoked to support the subpoena are unsupported, speculative, specious, and/or unconstitutional. The subpoena is more broad than reasonably necessary to support any claimed congressional objective. Chairman Jordan and the Judiciary Committee have offered no evidence in support of any legislative purpose they have attempted to invoke to justify their subpoena. And the subpoena is unduly burdensome because it would substantially burden both the New York criminal justice system and the District Attorney’s Office as it prepares for Mr. Trump’s criminal trial. The Committee’s subpoena also burdens the District Attorney and the criminal justice system by politicizing Mr. Trump’s trial and undermining the public’s faith in the integrity of the criminal justice system. The Committee’s subpoena to Mr. Pomerantz and its other intrusive serial requests for documents and testimony are plainly aimed at burdening the District Attorney’s Office by harassing them, attempting to intimidate them, and trying to distract them from their preparation of Mr. Trump’s criminal case. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23772947-read-alvin-braggs-lawsuit-against-house-judiciary-chairman-jim-jordan-over-trump-probe-interference